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I. INTRODUCTION
The idea of consent seems clearly established as central to many
dimensions of the law.1 But consent has of late become increasingly
problematic in theory and unmanageable in practice. Courts and
legislatures should, in consequence, reduce their reliance on the now
disintegrating idea of consent, and instead focus more consciously on the
ideas of basic interests and of widely acknowledged basic goods.
This Article presents evidence for the increasingly problematic
character of consent in a number of legal contexts. 2 The Article begins
t Lawrence A. Jegen III Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney
School of Law.
1. See, e.g., DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY 215
(1989) ("Consent theory has an extraordinarily firm hold on our imagination. It provides
perhaps the single most prevalent paradigm structuring our thinking about law, society,
morality, and politics"); Larry Alexander, The Ontology of Consent, 55 ANALYTIC PHIL.
102, 102 (2014) ("Consent is one of the most important concepts in both morality and the
law."); Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Clarifying Consent: Peter Westen's The Logic of
Consent, 25 L. & PHIL. 193, 194 (2006).
2. Without, of course, exhausting the range of legal contexts in which the idea of
consent currently plays a significant role. For an exceptionally valuable survey, see the
contributions to THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Franklin G. Miller &
Alan Wertheimer eds., 2010). For discussion of the narrow, literal problem of click-
through processes and meaningful consent, contrast Pratt v. Everalbum, Inc., 283 F.
Supp. 3d 664, 669 (E.D. Ill. 2017) (finding sufficient consent to dissemination of the
plaintiffs name through an on-screen click-through process) with Cohen v. Facebook,
Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1095 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (finding insufficient user consent
because of the breadth and complexity of the click-through user agreement).
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with a brief discussion of consent-based theories of political and legal
obligation in general.3 These consent theories are, by a justified near
consensus, defective.4 Reference is then made to the role of consent in
the private law of contracts, 5 including in medical informed consent
contexts,6 and in a sampling of the wide range of other legal contexts in
7which daunting questions of consent commonly arise.
The Article then briefly addresses the idea of consent as a defense to
criminal charges in general,8 and in sexual assault cases in particular,9
with some attention to current disputes over age of sexual consent
rules.10 The focus then turns to some illuminating cases involving
unemancipated minors who seek a judicial bypass of parental notification
and consent requirements in the context of access to abortion.11
On the basis of this survey of the law of consent, the Article
confronts fundamental problems regarding the meaning and value of the
consent inquiry in the law.1 2 The contrasting idea of interests, in the
relevant sense, is then introduced. 13 The contemporary conflict between"will" theories and "interest" theories of rights in general is then
addressed,1 4 furthering the defense of an enhanced legal role for the idea
of basic interests and basic goods, as distinct from that of consent. 15 An
account of how current thinking on questions of autonomy and
paternalism distinctively impeaches consent theory brings the Article to a
close. 16
3. See infra Section II.
4. See infra Section II.
5. See infra Section III.
6. See infra Section III and the sources cited infra note 60.
7. See infra Section III.
8. See infra Section III and the sources cited infra note 61.
9. See infra Section V.
10. See infra Section IV.
11. See infra Section IV.
12. See infra Sections V-VI.
13. See infra Section V.
14. See infra Section V.
15. See infra Section V.
16. See infra Section VI.
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II. THE DUBIOUS STATE OF CONSENT THEORIES OF POLITICAL
OBLIGATION
The idea of consent has long been central to accounts of the
legitimacy and authority of political regimes. 17 At the broadest level, it is
thought that consent is essential to our having some appropriate degree
of control over our lives, given that we need the assistance and
forbearance of others." Consent is thus linked to something like
autonomy or self-direction, perhaps along with a belief that competent
persons will typically understand their own interests better than others.
There is no single canonical formulation of the idea of consent in the
broad political context. We may, however, merely for the sake of
convenience, consider the formulation offered by Professor Richard
Flathman:
Assuming the circumstances are right for the question of consent
to arise, for B to consent he must: (a) know what he consents to,
(b) intend to consent to it, (c) communicate his knowledge of
what he is consenting to and his intention to consent (that is,
communicate his consent) [directly or indirectly] to the person or
persons to whom the consent is given.' 9
On some such basis, it has then been argued that "[n]aturalized citizens
explicitly agree to obey the state in the naturalization ceremony. 2 ° More
problematically, "[n]ative-born citizens implicitly [or tacitly] agree to
obey when they cease to be political minors and accept adult status, that
is, full membership, in the state., 21
Consent theories of political obligation have, quite understandably,
been challenged on several grounds. Most obviously, unless the consent
17. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT §§ 4-226 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press Student ed. 1988) (1690). For the rudiments of a consent-based
social contract approach, see PLATO, Crito, in EUTHYPHRO, APOLOGY, CRITO (F.J. Church
trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 2d rev. ed. 1956) (c. 360 B.C.E.). In the American judicial
context, see Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 455 (1793) for the assertion by Justice
Wilson that "[t]he only reason, I believe, why a free man is bound by human laws, is, that
he binds himself."
18. See JEREMY WALDRON, Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism, in LIBERAL
RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS 1981-1991 35, 47 (1993).
19. RICHARD E. FLATHMAN, POLITICAL OBLIGATION 220 (1972); see also Hanna
Pitkin, Obligation and Consent-l, 59 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 990 (1965); Hanna Pitkin,
Obligation and Consent-II, 60 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 39 (1966).
20. Harry Beran, In Defense of the Consent Theory of Political Obligation and




theorist wishes to conclude that few persons are morally bound to even
the best regime, there is the problem that few persons have meaningfully
consented to a political regime. As David Hume classically observed,
regardless of the method of consent, individuals typically cannot consent
without knowing that they are consenting and intending to consent. 23 If
most people do not believe that they have relevantly consented, then
consent will typically not have taken place.24
Specifically, voting in an election will not typically amount to
consent to the resulting regime. One might vote, for example, for the
least among various evils, to fend off the gravest moral evil. Or one may
simply not consciously intend to consent by voting, in the absence of any
clear social convention to the contrary. It would also seem that the
character, authority, and legitimacy of a gravely evil political regime
does not change because it has been widely consented to.25 And even if
voting implied some elements of consent, there would then be the further
problem of determining to what various voters had intended to consent.
One might vote while thinking primarily of a candidate, a particular
office, a term of that office, one or more policies, a regime, an
underlying constitution, or a desire to express a particular mood or
general attitude. One cannot consent merely in general.26 On the basis of
these and other problems,27 one could reasonably conclude that attempts
22. See, e.g., FLATHMAN, supra note 19, at 231 (considering both tacit, or implied,
consent as well as express consent); GEORGE KLOSKO, POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS 151
(2005) ("few citizens have actually consented to their government."); JOSEPH TUSSMAN,
OBLIGATION AND THE BODY POLITIC 36-37 (1960) ("many native 'citizens' have in no
meaningful sense agreed to anything."); CHRISTOPHER HEATH WELLMAN & A. JOHN
SIMMONS, Is THERE A DUTY TO OBEY THE LAW? 93, 118 (2005) (discussing typical
citizens as rarely freely committing to obey the law, tacitly or otherwise); David Enoch,
Against Public Reason 3, CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIv., https://www.ceu.edu/sites/defaul
/files/attachment/event/13116/enoch-against-public-reason.pdf ("For all modem states,
there is no normatively relevant sense of consent such that each and every one of those
subject to their authority has given her consent.").
23. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE bk. III, pt. II, § VIII, at 549
(L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press 1967) (1739) ("[W]e do not commonly
esteem our allegiance to be deriv'd from our consent or promise.").
24. See J.L. MACKIE, HUME'S MORAL THEORY 110 (1980) ("If present-day allegiance
rested on a promise, even a tacit one, people generally could not fail to know this.").
25. See I DEREK PARFIT, ON WHAT MATTERS 211 (Samuel Scheffier ed., 2011) ("The
Consent Principle cannot . . .be . . .the supreme principle of morality. Some acts are
wrong even though everyone could rationally consent to them.").
26. For background, see Loren E. Lomasky, Contract, Covenant, Constitution, 28
SOCIAL PHIL. & POL'Y 50, 53 (2011).
27. For further critique, see MARK C. MURPHY, NATURAL LAW IN JURISPRUDENCE AND
POLITICS ch. 4 (2006).
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to ground ordinary political authority and obligation in consent are likely
to be unsuccessful. 28
It is possible to advance a theory of political authority based not on
actual--either express or tacit-consent, but instead on some theory of
'hypothetical' consent. 29 From our perspective, though, the issue is not
whether hypothetical consent theories are attractive. 30 Theories of
hypothetical consent to a regime-roughly, that persons would in fact
consent if they were reasonable, well-informed, and fair-minded-are,
on their face, not really theories of consent as the term is used herein. As
Ronald Dworkin observed, "[a] hypothetical contract is not simply a pale
form of an actual contract; it is no contract at all."31
Whether one then chooses to endorse a theory of merely hypothetical
consent to a regime or not, one is left with more than ample grounds for
doubting the viability of a consent theory of political obligation. The
point of our brief discussion is certainly not to conclusively refute
consent theories of political obligation. Instead, the point is more
modestly to suggest some of the serious defects of classic and
contemporary consent theories of political obligation, and to begin to lay
the groundwork for an alternative approach focusing more fundamentally
on interests and on basic goods. 32
After all, political consent is given, presumably, with the expectation
of thereby promoting some substantial interests.33 It should not surprise
us if beneath, or indeed instead of, consent theories, we find the pursuit
of basic interests.34 But even where something approaching genuine
28. See, e.g., William A. Edmundson, Consent and Its Cousins, 121 ETHICS 335, 353
(2011) ("An inductive inference that all further attempts [to justify political authority via
consent] will fail seems warranted.").
29. See, e.g., WELLMAN& SIMMONs, supra note 22, at 117; WALDRON, supra note 18,
at 51.
30. For discussion, see David Enoch, Hypothetical Consent and the Value(s) of
Autonomy, 128 ETHCS 6 (2017); David Zimmerman, The Force of Hypothetical
Commitment, 93 ETIcs 467 (1983).
31. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 151 (1978); see also WELLMAN &
SIMMONS, supra note 22, at 117; WALDRON, supra note 18, at 51.
32. See infra Sections V-VI.
33. See, e.g., Michael Davis, Locke On Consent: The Two Treatises as Practical
Ethics, 62 PHIL. Q. 464, 479 (2012) (referring to social contract conscionability in light of
the significant benefits accruing therefrom).
34. The classic exponent of a focus on basic interests, as opposed to the
mystifications of general consent theory, is David Hume. See HUME, supra note 23, § IX,
at 550-51 ("[A] promise itself ... is invested with a view to a certain interest.... This
interest I find to consist in the security and protection, which we enjoy in political
society"); DAVID HUME, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in AN
ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING § 7, at 205 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed.,
1894) (1777) ("[T]he sole foundation of the duty of allegiance is the advantage, which it
3192018]
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consent obtains throughout the range of the law, we should place greater
emphasis on the fundamental interests and basic goods underlying such
cases.
III. THE DuBIous STATE OF CONSENT IN CONTRACT LAW
The idea of consent is central to the subject of contract law. It has
been argued that the idea of consent is fundamental to explaining, as well
as to justifying, contract law. a5 Consent theory in this sense seeks to
distinguish itself 36 from theories of contract that are based on the idea of
promise37 or on the idea of choice.38 We should assume, though, that
there can be consent theories that are broad enough to include theories of
contract law that emphasize the will, or volition, or subjectivity or broad
ranges of valuable eligible choices, along with consent in any narrow
sense.39
In a broad sense of the idea of consent, we may say that "all
contracts require consent as a prerequisite, [but] the meaning of consent
is obscure., 40 To some degree, the meaning of consent in various
contractual contexts may always have been obscure. Of late, though, the
obscurity, if not the utter fragmentation, of the idea of contractual
consent has become increasingly evident. Competent persons "often
agree to contracts with only the haziest notion of what terms they
include," 4' with contract formation being "routinely beset with threats 42
procures to society, by preserving peace and order among mankind."); DAVID HUME, ON
THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT (1752) reprinted in DAVID HUME'S POLITICAL ESSAYS 43, 60
(Charles W. Hendel ed., 1953) ("The general obligation which binds us to government is
the interest and necessities of society.").
35. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Contract is Not Promise; Contract is Consent, 45
SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 647, 649 (2012); Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 269 (1986) (seeking to distinguish promise-oriented theories of contract
emphasizing will, free volition, and subjectivity).
36. See Barnett, supra note 35, at 655.
37. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION 150-53 (2d ed. 2015) (distinguishing Barnett's approach).
38. See, e.g., HANOCH DAGAN & MICHAEL HELLER, THE CHOICE THEORY OF
CONTRACTS (2017) (emphasizing autonomy, along with utility and community, as
manifested in meaningful choices from among a range of varied and attractive types of
contract, rather than mere bargaining over possible contractual terms in any given
contractual context).
39. See supra notes 34-37.
40. Nancy S. Kim, Relative Consent and Contract Law, 18 NEV. L.J. 165, 168 (2017).
41. Nathan B. Oman, Reconsidering Contractual Consent, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 215,
215 (2017).
42. For a sense of the fragmentation and generally muddled state of the related idea of
coercion, see R. George Wright, Why the Coercion Test Is of No Use in Establishment
Clause Cases, 41 CUMB. L. REV. 93 (2011).
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and pressures that seem removed from the freely consenting parties
envisioned" by standard contract doctrine.43
As a matter of everyday experience, familiar ideas of consent seem
increasingly remote from routine contractual transactions. Thus"signatures, clicking buttons, browsing websites . . . do not necessarily
mean that the party consented to the business terms. Many consumers do
not read the agreements when they sign or when they click 'I accept,'
and with good reason. ', 44 It has long been true that actually reading
standardized contracts of adhesion is practically pointless, if not
irrational. 45 But the role of consent is of late becoming increasingly
dubious in a broad range of ordinary contractual settings. To these
complications, we might add further considerations, including those of
substantive or procedural unconscionability; 46  the purported
inalienability of certain rights that, as a result, cannot be transferred even
by consent;47 the role of morally questionable rationalizing and adaptive
preferences in choosing;48 the role of framing effects and other important
cognitive biases in consenting;49 and even the role of emotions and
43. Oman, supra note 41, at 215.
44. Chunlin Leonhard, Dangerous Or Benign Legal Fictions, Cognitive Biases, and
Consent in Contract Law, 91 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 385, 406 (2017); see also Pratt v.
Everalbum, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 2d 664, 669 (E.D. 111. 2017); Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., 798
F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1095 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
45. See Sierra David Sterkin, Challenging Adhesion Contracts in California: A
Consumer's Guide, 34 GOLDEN GATE UNIv. L. REV. 285, 287 (2004) ("Many times,
consumer neither understand nor read adhesion contracts. Even if a consumer reads and
understands an adhesion contract, there is no room for negotiation.").
46. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (AM. LAW INST. & UNrW. LAW COMM'N 1977); Arthur Alan
Leff, Unconscionability and the Code - The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV.
485 (1967); see also Anne Fleming, The Rise and Fall of Unconscionability as the "Law
of the Poor", 102 GEO. L.J. 1383 (2014); Hila Keren, Guilt-Free Markets?:
Unconscionability, Conscience, and Emotions, 2016 BYU L. REV. 427 (2016); Colleen
McCullough, Unconscionability as a Coherent Legal Concept, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 779,
781-82 (2016); Jennifer Nadler, Unconscionability, Freedom, and The Portrait of a
Lady, 27 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 213, 214 (2015).
47. For examples of further discussion, see, TERRANCE MCCONNELL, INALIENABLE
RIGHTS: THE LIMITS OF CONSENT IN MEDICINE AND THE LAW (2000); Barnett, A Consent
Theory, supra note 35, at 321; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of
Property Rights, 85 COLuM. L. REV. 931, 931 (1985) (noting legal limitations on the
consensual alienation of some rights, presumably for the sake of protecting certain
fundamental interests).
48. For an example, see, John D. Walker, Liberalism, Consent, and the Problem of
Adaptive Preferences, 21 Soc. THEORY & PRAc. 457, 459 (1995). For an even broader
example, see Jon Elster, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY 110
(1983).
49. See Jason Hanna, Consent and the Problems of Framing Effects, 14 ETHICAL
THEORY & MORAL PRAc. 517 (2011) (noting the possibility of consenting under a general
description of a transaction, while dissenting under other equally reasonable descriptions
2018]
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psychological disabilities.5 ° In view of these crucial complications, one
might emphasize the role of context in establishing the basic meanings of
51contractual consent. Or, one might try to abandon the idea of consent as
a binary category, in favor of some sort of graduated continuum or
degrees of consent. 52 We need take no side in these controversies, other
than to note their own further contribution to the instability, murkiness,
and equivocality of the idea of legal consent. Anyone who still wishes to
attempt a consistent account of the role of consent in contracts in general,
and in matters such as police searches,53 consenting to kidnapping, 54
marital consent,55 credit card issuance,56 door-to-door sales contracts,57
of the transaction. Much more broadly, see the essays collected in HEURISTICS AND
BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin &
Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002). In the medical informed consent area, see TOM L.
BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOETHICS 125 (7th ed. 2013).
50. Classically, note the arguably consensually bargained exchange, in which
depression-like symptoms may play a causal role, in JOHANN WOLFGANG VON GOETHE,
FAUST, pt. I, at 183-85 (Walter Kauffman trans., 1990) (1808).
51. See, e.g., Brian H. Bix, Consent and Contracts, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF
THE ETHICS OF CONSENT (Andreas Muller & Peter Schaber eds., Routledge 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3031183. For a broader sense of the
role of context in addressing basic questions, see CONTEXTUAL1SM IN PHILOSOPHY:
KNOWLEDGE, MEANING, AND TRUTH (Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter eds., 2005). See also
Steward Cohen, Knowledge and Context, 83 J. PHIL. 574 (1986); Keith DeRose,
Contextualism: An Explanation and Defense, FITELSON (1999), https://fitelson.org/
epistemology/derose.pdf; Patrick Ryskiew, Episternic Contextualism, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. Mar. 29, 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contex
tualism-epistemology.
52. See, e.g., Orit Gan, The Many Faces of Contractual Consent, 65 DRAKE L. REV.
615 (2017) (explicitly borrowing the title from William N. Eskridge, Jr., THE MANY
FACES OF SEXUAL CONSENT, 37 WM. & MARY L. REv. 47 (1995)). Of course, "consent"
often means something like "legally sufficient consent," as distinct from a greater or
lesser degree of factual consent.
53. See James C. McGlinchy, Note, "Was That a Yes or a No?": Reviewing
Voluntariness in Consent Searches, 104 VA. L. REV. 301 (2018) (noting the complicating
roles of subtle coercion and intimidation, pressure, cultural fears, and discrimination with
regard to police search consent).
54. See Commonwealth v. Colon, 726 N.E.2d 909 (Mass. 2000) (holding twelve-
year-old child incapable of consenting to kidnapping).
55. See Mims v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 60 S.E.2d 501 (Ga. Ct. App. 1950)
("ratification" of marriage upon reaching the legal-age of consent to marry). Query how
long the window of opportunity to consent, or not consent, to one's underage marriage
should remain open thereafter.
56. See Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub.
L No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (2009) (codified in relevant part at 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et.
seq. and § 1637(c)(8)) (extending credit to underage consumers).
57. For the non-waivable, if not inalienable, right to a three-day cooling-off period
with respect to door-to-door. sales transactions conferred by federal regulation, see 16
C.F.R. §§ 429.1,429.1(d) (1995).
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58personal name changes, tattooing procedures,59 voting in local
elections,6 ° health care informed consent contexts,61 and as a general
defense in criminal cases,6 2 is welcome to try.
IV. AT THE FRONT LINES OF CONSENT: UNEMANCIPATED MINORS AND
CONSENT IN THE ABORTION ACCESS CASES
For the sake of concreteness, let us turn to a particular area of the law
in which the deficiencies of consent theory, and the often
58. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 674.6 (2016) (allowing 14-year-old children, but not a 13-
year olds, to change their names without parental consent).
59. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-10-19 (2018) (tattooing a minor is a
misdemeanor unless signed parental consent is obtained); Bums by Bums v. Adler, 653
N.Y.S.2d 814 (White Plains City Ct. 1996) (discussing the scope of a New York State
statute criminalizing the tattooing of any child under the age of 18).
60. See, e.g., Fenit Nirappil, Youthful March For Our Lives Revives Push to Lower
Voting Age to 16 in D.C., WASH. POST (April 10, 2018), www.washingtonpost.com/loca
I/dc-politics/youth-drive-march.
61. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 49, at 125, 138 (defining "voluntary"
action as broader and more inclusive than "autonomous" action); NEIL MANSON &
ONORA O'NETLL, RETHINKING INFORMED CONSENT IN BIOETHICS (2007); Wendy Netter
Epstein, Nudging Patient Decision-Making, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1255, 1255 (2017) (noting
the lack of stable preferences among patients, the presence of decision-making biases,
and advocating a greater emphasis on patient well-being, as distinct from a dubious
patient autonomy focus); Eleanor Milligan & Jennifer Jones, Rethinking Autonomy and
Consent in Healthcare Ethics, in BIOETHICS: MEDICAL, ETHICAL AND LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES (Peter A. Clark, ed. 2016) (noting a lack of patient understanding, as well
as basic interdependence, vulnerability, and the necessity of trust); Onora O'Neill, Some
Limits of Informed Consent, 29 J. MED. ETHICS 4 (2002) (noting in particular the variety
of concepts of 'autonomy' in circulation); Nir Eyal, Informed Consent, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Sept. 20, 2011), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/informed-
consent (noting the possible conflicts between requiring informed consent and promoting
patient well-being).
62. For a comprehensive and careful account, see PETER WESTEN, THE LOGIC OF
CONSENT: THE DIVERSITY AND DECEPTIVENESS OF CONSENT AS A DEFENSE TO CRIMINAL
CONDUCT 3-9, 307 (2004); id. at 122 (the law as imputing consent, in the form of a legal
fiction, depending upon "the person's legitimate interests in the matter"); Dennis J.
Baker, The Moral Limits of Consent as a Defense in the Criminal Law, 12 NEW CRIM. L.
REV. 93 (2009) (consent as sometimes overridable by weightier considerations); Gerald
Dworkin, Harm and the Volenti Principle, 29 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 309 (2012); John
Kleinig & North Ryde, Consent as a Defense in Criminal Law, 65 ARCHIVES FOR PHIL. OF
L. & SOC. PHI. 329-31 (1979) (the quality and weight of consent as variable, particularly
as the gravity of the harm to affected interests increases); Jonathan Parry, Defensive
Harm, Consent and Intervention, 35 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 356 (2017); Marc Ramsay,
Slaves, Gladiators, and Death: Kantian Liberalism and the Moral Limits of Consent, 23
LEGAL THEORY 96 (2017) (not all gruesome and degrading consensual activities as
equivalent to voluntary slavery); Victor Tadros, Consent to Harm, 64 CURRENT LEGAL
PROBS. 23, 23 (2011) ("[T]here are . . . circumstances in which it has been regarded
wrong for one person to harm another even though the other consented to be harmed").
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underacknowledged role of the most basic interests and goods, may be
brought into focus. Consider the current law regarding parental consent
or parental notification requirements, and the possible judicial bypass
thereof, imposed upon minors who seek access to abortion. As it turns
out, consent inquiries in this area of the law introduce more arbitrariness
and subjectivity than would be associated with focus on the relevant
basic goods and interests.
The role of consent in the related area of sexual harassment and
sexual assault cases is deeply contested,63 and in ways that call the value
of the consent inquiry itself into serious question. The tangled issues
attending sexual age of consent laws 64 further impeach the distinctive
value of any consent inquiry, 65 apart from a more substantive
consideration of the basic interests and goods at stake.
63. See, e.g., Vera Bergelson, The Meaning of Consent, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 171,
171 (2014) ("Numerous limitations curtail the magical powers of consent."); id. at 177
("[D]ifferent models of consent should be used depending on whether the role of consent
in a particular case is inculpatory or exculpatory."); Tom Dougherty, Yes Means Yes:
Consent as Communication, 43 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 224 (2015); Aya Gruber, Consent
Confusion, 38 CARDozo L. REv. 415, 417 (2016) ("Consent is a liberal contractarian
principle that seems a peculiar basis for the criminal regulation of sex. The contractual
framework is both over-and under-inclusive."); Robert Jubb, Consent and Deception, 12
J. ETHICS & SOC. PHmi. 223, 223 (2017) ("If we deceive someone about a feature of a
sexual encounter we have with her or him she or he would be 'all things considered
unwilling to engage in' if she or he knew it has this feature, that sex is nonconsensual.');
Carole Pateman, Women and Consent, 8 POL. THEORY 149, 162 (1980) ("Writers on
consent link 'consent,' 'freedom,' and 'equality,' but the realities of power and
domination in our sexual and political lives are ignored."); Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Consent: What It Means and Why It's Time to Require It, 47 U. PAC. L. REv. 665, 669
(2016) ("While silence and passivity cannot by themselves be treated as consent, they are
forms of conduct, and all of a person's conduct should be taken into account"). For
administrative and legislative examples, see, DEP'T OF EDUC., REVISED SEXUAL
HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER
STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES, TITLE IX (2001), https://www2.ed.gov./about/offices/list
/ocr/docs/shguide.html, as well as California's "affirmative consent standard" embodied
in CAL EDUC. CODE § 67386 (2014). See also id. § (a)(1) ("Lack of protest or resistance
does not mean consent, nor does silence mean consent.").
64. See generally From 11 to 21: Ages of Consent Around the World, THE WEEK
(March 6, 2018), http://www.theweek.co.uk/92121/ages-of-consent-around-the-world;
Valentine Faure, Opinion, Can an 11-Year-Old-Girl Consent to Sex?, N.Y. TIMEs (Oct. 5,
2017), www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/opinion/sex-consent-france.html; Marie Doezema,
France, Where the Age of Consent Is Up For Debate, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 10, 2018),
www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/03/frances-existential-crisis; Alissa J.
Rubin & Elian Pettier, In the #MeToo Era, France Struggles With Sexual Crimes
Involving Minors, N.Y. TIMEs (Apr. 13, 2018), www.nytimes.com/2018/04/13/world/
europe/france-minors-sex-consent-rape.html; France to Set Legal Age of Consent at 15,
BBC NEWS (Mar. 6, 2018), www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-43300313.
65. For an exceptionally lucid and well-researched account of the neurological and
cognitive development science applying crucially to adolescents' choices, see JENNIFER
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The law of parental consent or notification requirements, and the
possible judicial bypass thereof, in cases of minors seeking abortion
access has developed over time. Perhaps the most crucial case, featuring
several separate opinions, is that of Bellotti v. Baird.66 The Court in
Bellotti observed that "minors often lack the experience, perspective, and
judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to
them., 67 In particular, "immature minors often lack the ability to make
fully informed choices that take account of both immediate and long-
range consequences. 68
Thus, there is often an entirely sensible shift to considering at least
some of the interests at stake. Partly on these assumptions, the courts
have settled on some version of the idea that the Constitution requires
that a minor be able to bypass a parental consent requirement when she
can establish that "either: (1) she is mature enough and well-informed
enough to make her abortion decision ... independently of her parents'
wishes; or (2) even if she is not able to make this decision independently,
the desired abortion would be in her best interests. 69
Answering the first question-whether the minor is sufficiently
mature and informed to meaningfully consent, independently, to an
abortion-is a deeply murky and contested inquiry. Bellotti itself
recognizes that it is "difficult to define, let alone determine, maturity. 70
The courts have attempted to somehow judicially consider not only the
woman's substantive testimony, 71 but her "carriage, demeanor, [and]
ANN DROBAC, SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF TEENAGERS: ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT,
DISCRIMINATION, AND CONSENT LAW 43-54 (2016). Professor Drobac has proposed that a
minor's assent to sex should be legally revocable, on grounds of exploitation, at the
initiative of the minor, before reaching some specified age, after a judicial hearing
focused on the minor's best interests. See Jennifer A. Drobac, Age-of-Consent Laws
Don't Reflect Teenage Psychology. Here's How to Fix Them, Vox (Nov. 20, 2017),
www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/11/20/16677180/age-consent-teenage-psychology.
66. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (requiring statutory permission for the
minor child to petition the court directly without first consulting with a parent).
67. Id. at 635 (plurality opinion).
68. Id. at 640; see also Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm'r, 258 F.
Supp. 3d 929 (S.D. Ind. 2017), appeal filed, no. 17-2428 (7th Cir. Jul. 14, 2017);
Commonwealth v. Weston, 913 N.E.2d 832 (Mass. 2009).
69. Planned Parenthood of Idaho, Inc. v. Wasden, 376 F.3d 908, 922 (9th Cir. 2004)
(internal quotations omitted).
70. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643, n.23 (plurality opinion); see, e.g., Exparte Anonymous,
806 So. 2d 1269, 1273-74 (Ala. 2001).
71. In re Doe, 166 P.3d 293, 295 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007); Ex parte Anonymous, 806
So. 2d at 1272.
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deportment," 72 her "background, 73 and "sundry other circumstances. 74
The door to judicial subjectivity, fallacy, and bias is thus further opened.
One might think of the court's admission that "[n]o definitive list of
criteria can be adopted to determine maturity" 75 as an indication of
judicial modesty, if not humility. But as it turns out, courts often treat the
openness of the question of sufficient maturity to consent as licensing not
just gross subjectivity but arbitrary judicial politics. 76
In one formulation, courts are encouraged to consider the minor's"experience, perspective, and judgment., 77 More elaborately, courts may
choose to attend to the minor's information level and understanding, as
supplied by a health-care provider, regarding her own health risks,78
along with her understanding of the ramifications of alternatives to
abortion, 79 and her awareness "of the emotional and psychological
aspects of undergoing an abortion."8 Whether we choose to regard these
criteria as somehow justified, they are open to being interpreted laxly or
rigorously within a broad range, and can be balanced in one political
direction or another, as the court may be so inclined.
Unfortunately, any attempt at greater elaboration of what is required
for meaningful consent under these circumstances adds less to judicial
determinacy and judicial constraint than to the opportunities to further
indulge judicial biases. To all the above, further add considerations such
81 8as the minor's age, school performance,82  school and career
83 8aspirations, medical contingency plans,84 plans for making any
necessary medical care payments, or the insufficiency thereof. Courts
may also consider, with whatever degree of weight in any given case,
further social skills,; intelligence,; verbal skills,; experience (as a minor)
72. Exparte Anonymous, 806 So. 2d at 1272; In re Anonymous, 650 So. 2d 919, 920
(Ala- 1994); see also In re Anonymous, 888 So. 2d 1265, 1272 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004)
(per curiam).
73. Exparte Anonymous, 806 So. 2d at 1274.
74. Id.; In re Doe, 166 P.3d at 295.
75. In re Doe, 166 P.3d at 295.
76. See infra notes 79-8 1.
77. R.B. ex rel. V.D. v. State, 790 So. 2d 830, 833 (Miss. 2001) (en banc).
78. See In re Doe, 19 S.W.3d 346, 358 (Tex. 2000).
79. See id.
80. Id.
81. See In re Doe, 113 So. 3d 882, 885-86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012); In re Doe, 36
So. 3d 164, 165 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
82. See In re Doe, 113 So. 3d 882 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012); In re Doe, 36 So. 3d
164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). Should abortion access, all else equal, really be a function






in living away from home,; handling any personal, family, or job
finances,; conduct in general,, and any currently experienced level of
stress, all as implicating the minor's capacity to consent.86 The sheer
proliferation of arguably relevant - if unweighted - considerations
going to the minor's capacity to meaningfully consent again adds to the
overall unfettered subjective discretion of the trial courts as well as that
of any court reviewing the record on appeal.
Part of the problem in this context is that some of the relevant
considerations, at the hearing and on appeal, straddle the familiar line
between "adjudicative facts" and "legislative facts,, 87 involving
substantially different kinds of evidence.88 Sufficiency of a capacity for
consent may even involve some elements of a question of law, of social
policy, or of philosophy, which is beyond the realm of even typical
legislative facts.89
Typically, the parental consent or notification bypass cases involve
opposing ideologies and moral sentiments intertwined with a conceptual
and empirical dispute over the presence or absence of a sufficient
capacity to consent.9" As an illuminating example, consider the Alabama
Supreme Court opinion in Ex Parte Anonymous.91 In this case, the trial
court judge conducting the parental bypass hearing reportedly remarked,
"This is a beautiful young girl with a bright future and she does not need
to have a butcher get a hold of her.",92
86. See In re Doe, 113 So. 3d 882, 885 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012); In re Doe, 973 So.
2d 548, 551 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). These considerations, however unwieldy they
may be, are taken up under the consent inquiry. It is certainly true that some or all might
also be relevant if we were to ask, as these courts sometimes do, about the interests of the
minor. Our key point is that emphasizing basic interests, and basic goods, allows for
greater consensus and determinacy than other approaches.
87. For discussion of this distinction, see KENNETH CULP DAvis, 1 ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW § 7.02 (1959); Ann Woolhandler, Rethinking the Judicial Reception of Legislative
Facts, 41 VAND. L. REV. 111 (1988). As an example of an adjudicative fact, consider the
question of whether the plaintiff or the defendant entered the particular intersection first,
or against a red light. As an example of a legislative fact, consider whether consumption
of a particular drug, or texting, or talking on the phone, tends to impair driving ability.
88. Consider, for example, whether the outcomes of the judicial bypass cases might
tend to be better, in any relevant sense, if the judges conducting the hearings had a clear
grasp of the relevant biological, psychological, and social science. See, e.g., DROBAC,
SExUAL EXPLOITATION OF TEENAGERS, supra note 65, at 43-54.
89. But consider the emphasis on the role of the hearing court's findings of "fact" in
In re Anonymous, 833 So. 2d 75, 81 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002); Exparte Anonymous, 806
So. 2d 1269, 1273 (Ala. 2001); In re Doe, 932 So. 2d 278, 282-83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2005).
90. See, e.g., Exparte Anonymous, 803 So. 2d 542 (Ala. 2001) (per curiam).
91. 803 So. 2d 542 (Ala. 2001) (per curiam).
92. Id. at 554 (See, J., concurring specially); id. at 561 (Johnstone, J., dissenting).
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While we might profitably consider nearly every element of this
judicial declaration, the explicit reference herein to a "butcher" 93 invites
special consideration. This reference to "butchery," without clarification,
is ambiguous as to its intended scope of application. The reference might
well be to a merely hypothetical physician.
But whatever the trial judge's intention, it is, or should be,
common ground that:
[I]t is not the [trial] court's responsibility to superimpose its
judgment or its moral convictions on the minor in regard to what
course of action she should take with reference to her own body.
It is not a question of whether she is making a decision that we
would approve of, but whether she is making a mature decision
or one in her best interest.94
More formally, if the state has adopted a position of neutrality with
respect to how the choice of the minor's abortion access choice is
ultimately exercised, 95 a judge's own dispositions in this regard should
be irrelevant. But the largely unnecessary-and in any event multi-
faceted unmanageably complex, and open-ended-inquiry into the
minor's supposed degree of maturity and capacity to consent again
invites largely unconstrained judicial subjectivity.
A simpler, more transparent, and more directly relevant approach
would focus more thoroughly on the basic underlying interests, as
distinct especially from the supposed quality of the minor's capacity to
consent. The current statutory and case law does refer to the interests, or
lack thereof, on the part of the state,96 the minor in question,97 and
93. Judge Johnstone notes the apparent absence of record evidence "that the medical
provider would butcher the petitioner." Id. at 561 (Johnstone, J., dissenting).
94. In re Anonymous, 905 So. 2d 845, 850-51 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) (quoting Ex
parte Anonymous, 618 So. 2d 722, 725 (Ala. 1993)), overruled by Exparte Anonymous,
803 So. 2d 542 (Ala. 2001). Note the understandable tendency to look to interests in
general when the issues of consent become daunting.
95. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Idaho, Inc. v. Wasden, 376 F. Supp. 2d 1012,
1019 (D. Idaho 2005) (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452, 1460 (8th
Cir. 1995)); Planned Parenthood of the Great Nw. v. State, 375 P.3d 1122, 1144-45
(Alaska 2016).
96. See, e.g., Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990); Planned
Parenthood of Idaho, Inc. v. Wasden, 376 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1019 (D. Idaho 2005)
(quoting Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452, 1460 (8th Cir. 1995)); Planned
Parenthood of the Great Nw. v. State, 375 P.3d 1122, 1144-45 (Alaska 2016)..
97. See, e.g., Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 295 (1997); Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (plurality opinion); Hope Clinic for Women, Ltd. v. Flores, 991
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sometimes the minor's family relationships.98 Doubtless the idea of
interests in general, as distinct from basic interests or basic goods, has its
complications.99 But the idea of consent, even at its core, is for our
purposes both remarkably unclear, subjective, deeply controversial, 100
and of largely secondary importance.
Broadening the focus, then, let us consider the alternative ideas of
interests, basic interests, and basic goods as a way of largely avoiding the
law's often dubious pursuit of the idea of consent. 01
V. INTERESTS, BASIC INTERESTS, AND BASIC GOODS
The idea of interests, as when some choice is said to be in the
interests of a person or group, is clearly distinguishable from most
understandings of consent. One thus might not consent to a transaction
that is in one's interests, and one might consent to a transaction that
N.E.2d 745, 766-67 (111. 2013); In re Doe, 932 So. 2d 278, 285-86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2005).
98. See, e.g., Hope Clinic, 991 N.E.2d at 766-67; In re Doe, 932 So. 2d at 285-86.
99. See infra Section V.
100. See supra Sections II-IV. It is fair to say that the nature of consent is
fundamentally contested. See, e.g., HEIDI M. HURD, THE NORMATIVE FORCE OF CONSENT,
iN THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF THE ETcs OF CONSENT (Andreas Muller & Peter
Schaber eds., 2018) (examining "eight possible accounts of the normative force of
consent"); Larry Alexander, The Ontology of Consent, 55 ANALYTIC PffiL. 102, 102
(2014) ("Consent cannot be a... mere outward behavior. Nor can it be a combination of
some mental state and an outward signification of that mental state. Rather, consent is a
mental state, and its signification is merely evidence of its existence."); id. at 103 ("One
can consent in an indefinite number of ways."); id. at 107 (the relevant mental state
amounting to consent is neither intending that conduct by someone else actually take
place, nor acquiescing in that conduct, but instead, is waiving one's otherwise viable right
that the conduct in question not occur); id. at 113 ("The informational requirements for
successfully consenting-the degree to which one must understand the nature and
consequences of the act to which one is attempting to consent-is quite
undertheorized."); Larry Alexander, Heidi Hurd & Peter Westen, Consent Does Not
Require Communication: A Reply to Dougherty, 44 L. & PmL. 1, 1 (2016) ("Although
each of us gives a slightly different account of the attitude that constitutes consent, we all
agree that consent is constituted by that attitude and need not be communicated in order
to alter the morality of another's conduct."); Gerald Dworkin, Harm and the Volenti
Principle, 29 Soc. P-iL. & Pol'y 309, 318 (2012) (discussing three separate models of
consent emphasizing, respectively, transfer, uniting of wills, and a surrender of a right to
complain); Ferzan, supra note 1, at 196 (Professor Westen as distinguishing "factual
attitudinal consent, factual expressive consent, prescriptive attitudinal (or expressive)
consent, and imputed consent"); David Owens, The Possibility of Consent, 24 RATIO 402,
411 (2011) ("Consent needs to be communicated to be valid."). See generally
Symposium, Sex and Consent, I & II, in 2 LEGAL THEORY 87 (1996).
101. See infra Sections V-VI.
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impairs one's basic interests. 10 2 This may be especially clear once we set
aside the sense of 'interest' in which a person might happen to be
subjectively interested in something, 10 3 as perhaps in the possible
planetary status of Pluto.'0 4
Thus, even when someone has fully and freely consented to some
policy, we can ask the deeper, more basic, question of whether that
policy is really in the consenting party's interests, or in anyone else's
interests. The idea of being in the interests of some person or group
clearly involves a basic normative element. ° 5 The idea of an interest can
operate in a fundamentally critical way,0 6 and not merely to legitimize
an established regime. 107
If we turn our attention from interests in general to basic or
fundamental interests, we discover-amidst the unavoidable
disagreements-a surprising degree of determinacy and practical
consensus.108 At a basic level, lists of fundamental interests even for a
richly pluralistic and diverse society display far more concurrence than
contention. Basic interests are often formulated in terms of primary' 0 9 or
102. See, e.g., Theodore M. Benditt, Law and the Balancing of Interests, 3 Soc.
THEORY & PRAc. 321, 323 (1975); R.N. Berki, Interests and Moral Ideals, 49 PHIL. 265,
269 (1974) ("'What people actually want' is logically independent of any concept I may
have of their 'interests."').
103. See, e.g., R.G. Frey, Rights, Interests, Desires, and Beliefs, 16 Am. PHIL. Q. 233,
234 (1979).
104. See, e.g., Mike Wall, Welcome Back, Pluto? Planethood Debate Reignites,
SPACE.COM (May 11, 2018), www.space.com/40550-pluto-planet-debate-flares-up-
again.html.
105. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, THE TERMS OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 46 (1974)
(being in someone's interests as involving some sort of benefit to that person or group,
thus providing a prima facie reason for supporting the policy); Richard E. Flathman,
Some Familiar But False Dichotomies Concerning "Interests": A Comment on Benditt
and Oppenheim, 3 POL. THEORY 277, 280 (1975) (noting the normative character of
interests).
106. See, e.g., S.I. Benn, 'Interests' in Politics, 60 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN Soc'Y 123,
130 (1960) ("Why should we not say that the slave's interests were not recognized by
Greek society, but were morally legitimate none the less?").
107. See id.
108. For a sense of the reasonable determinacy of prominent accounts of basic human
interests and goods, see, Christopher M. Rice, Defending the Objective List Theory of
Well-Being, 26 RATIO 196 (2013).
109. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 63 (1971) (discussing "primary
goods" as "things that every rational man is presumed to want," and which "normally
have a use whatever a person's rational plan of life"). Rawls separates, to some degree,
the primary "natural" goods including "health and vigor, intelligence and imagination,"
from the primary "social" goods of "self-respect" and relevant "rights and liberties,
powers and opportunities, income and wealth." Id. It should be emphasized that in
Rawls's formulation, income and wealth should be understood in a relatively broad sense.
Rawls's colleague Samuel Freeman has thus observed that "[a] mendicant monk with no
330 .[Vol. 64:315
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fundamental goods, 10 basic needs,"' basic capacities or capabilities," 2
or basic well-being." 3 Regardless of these largely interchangeable
characterizations, our judgments as to what constitutes a basic interest
tend toward a meaningfully determinate consensus.
visible income still has access to far more wealth than a poor person if the monk lives in a
monastery with access to a library, a private room, an elaborate chapel, and tranquil
cloisters or gardens in which to relax, stroll, and meditate." SAMUEL FREEMAN, RAWLS
153 (2007).
110. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 85-97 (Paul Craig
ed., 2d ed. 2011) (including knowledge, life itself, 'play' in a broad sense, aesthetic
experience, sociability or friendship, practical reasonableness in decision making, and
religion in the broad sense of reasonably reflecting on ultimate questions, including
origins, and the possibility of transcendence). For further discussion of Finnis's list, see
MARK C. MURPHY, NATURAL LAW IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICS 5-6, 66 nn.5-6
(2006). W.D. Ross focuses on what he takes to be "intrinsic" goods, including "virtue,
pleasure, the allocation of pleasure to the virtuous, and knowledge (and in a lesser degree
right opinion)." For discussion of Ross' list, see RICHARD KRAUT, WHAT Is GOOD AND
WHY: THE ETHICS OF WELL-BEING 91-92 (2007). For further examination of basic goods,
see PHILIPPA FOOT, NATURAL GOODNESS 88 (2001); DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND
PERSONS 4, 467, 499 (1984).
111. See A.H. Maslow, A Theory of Human Motivation, 50 PSYCHOL. REv. 37-39
(1943) (focusing more descriptively on psychological needs, safety needs, love needs,
esteem needs, self-actualization needs, and "the desires to know and understand").
Maslow disclaims any rigidly invariant hierarchy of these basic needs. Id. at 386; see also
DAVID BRAYBROOKE, MEETING NEEDS 36 (1987) (referring to basic course-of-life needs,
including a life-supporting environment, food and water, exercise and rest,
companionship and sexuality, education, social acceptance and recognition, and freedom
from continual fear).
112. See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT APPROACH 18-36 (2011). Professor Nussbaum's particularized list
encompasses ten central capabilities including life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses,
imagination, and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; relation to other species;
play or recreation; and some control over one's political and material environment. See
id. at 33-34; see also AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 231 (2011) (referring to "a
person's capability to do things he or she has reason to value"). For a broad but concise
survey, see Ingrid Robeyns, The Capability Approach, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL.
(Oct. 3, 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/capability-approach. For analyses of
Professor Nussbaum's approach, see Roger Claassen & Marcus Duwell, The Foundations
of Capability Theory: Comparing Nussbaum and Gewirth, 16 ETHICAL THEORY &
MORAL PRAC. 493 (2013); Alison M. Jaggar, Reasoning About Well-Being: Nussbaum's
Methods of Justifying the Capabilities Approach, 14 J. POL. PHIL. 301 (2006).
113. This formulation may reflect largely terminological differences. See Guy Fletcher,
Objective List Theories, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF WELL-BEING
ch. 12 (Guy Fletcher ed., 2016); id. at 152 (referring to "health, pleasure, friendship,
knowledge, achievement"); Guy Fletcher, A Fresh Start for the Objective-List Theory of
Well-Being, 25 UTILITAS 206, 214 (2013) (referring to "Achievement, Friendship,
Happiness, Pleasure, Self-Respect, Virtue"); Rice, supra note 108, at 196 (referring to
"loving relationships, meaningful knowledge, autonomy, achievement, and pleasure").
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Concretely, it is difficult to argue against some recognizable version
of, say, health,114 practical reasonableness,1 5 meaningful knowledge, 16
safety, 1 7 food and water, 118 and bodily integrity 19 as typically basic or
fundamental goods. Of course, recognizing basic interests themselves
hardly dictates the resolution of concrete legal and policy controversies.
In any given case, basic interests may well appear, to one degree or
another, on both sides of the controversy. Consensual gladiators,12° for
example, might seek to promote their interest in basic wealth 121 at the
risk of their basic interest in health 122 or physical safety12 3 and bodily
integrity. 24 Any approach to jurisprudence, whether focused on consent
or on crucial basic interests, must somehow address the problems
associated with that particular approach.1 25 The chief advantage of
focusing on largely uncontroversial basic interests is the possibility of
largely bypassing the wide variety of serious and deeply contested issues,
including psychology and metaphysics, currently confronting ideas of
consent.
Consent theories are not normally thought of as rivals to interest-
based theories as attempts to account specifically for the various rights
we are thought to possess. But if we broaden the focus beyond consent to
encompass a wide range of exercises of the will, then so- called will
theories can indeed rival interest-based theories in accounting for rights.
To the substantial extent that will theories of rights inherit any of the
problems associated with consent, will theories unfortunately remain
burdened by the problems discussed above. 126
It is certainly not surprising to see moral and legal rights as
associated with, and largely explained and justified in terms of, the most
114. See supra note 109.
115. See supra note 110.
116. See supra note 110.
117. See supra note 111.
118. See supra note 111.
119. See supra note 112.
120. See, e.g., Ramsay, supra note 62.
121. See supra note 109.
122. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 112, at 33-34.
123. See BRAYBROOKE, supra note 111, at 36.
124. See id.; NuSSBAUM, supra note 112, at 33-34.
125. For consideration of the "proportionalist" balancing of various interests, basic and
otherwise, see R. George Wright, A Hard Look at Exacting Scrutiny, 85 UMKC L. REv.
207 (2017); Robert Alexy, Constitutional Rights, Balancing and Rationality, 16 RATIO
JuRis 131 (2003); Julian Rivers, Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review, 65
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 174 (2006).
126. See supra Sections II-IV.
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basic interests. 127 On interest-based theories, rights are normally, but not
always, reflective of private or public interests. 128 It is possible to hold
legal rights that undermine one's interests, basic or otherwise, 129 but this
is not the typical pattern.
Interest theories of rights thus focus primarily on whose interests are
benefitted by recognizing the right in question. 130 In contrast, will
theories of rights focus primarily not on interests, but on who has the
competence and authority to insist upon or else to waive the right in
question.131
The obvious challenge to will theories of rights that emphasize the
competent invoking or waiver of rights is to account for the popular
sense that minor children, incompetent persons, and perhaps animals can
have interests, or genuine legal and moral rights, even if they are not
themselves competent to waive or consent to the waiver of such rights.
132
Will theorists in particular would also have to offer a satisfactory account
of non-waivable, or inalienable, rights.1 33 And there is of course the
problem of moral and legal limits of even assumedly valid consent and
other expressions of will. 134
127. See, e.g., VIRGINIA HELD, THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS
(1970) (discussing interests as mediating between a person or group's wants and their
rights); MATTHEW H. KRAMER, LIBERALISM WITH EXCELLENCE 141-44 (2017)
(elaborating on Ronald Dworkin's strong linkage of rights to their underlying justifying
interests); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 165-92 (1986) (discussing some
interests as a sufficient justification for recognizing moral or legal rights); Frey, supra
note 103, at 223 (noting the popular view that "all and only beings which have interests
can have rights"); T.M. Scanlon, Rights and Interests, in I ARGUMENTS FOR A BETTER
WORLD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF AMARTYA SEN 68, 70 (Kaushik Basu & Ravi Kanbur eds.,
2008) (discussing rights as justified by their role in protecting important interests).
128. See, e.g., Visa A.J. Kurki, Rights, Harming and Wrongdoing: A Restatement of
the Interest Theory, 38 Ox. J. LEGAL STUD. 430 (2018).
129. A person might have a legal and moral right to a certain tract of land that is,
unfortunately, burdened with toxic chemicals and subject to costly remediation, where
the rights-holder is the only solvent defendant. Such a right might, paradoxically,
undermine the right-holder's overall interests. See Matthew H. Kramer, Rights Without
Trimmings, in MATTHEW H. KRAMER, ET AL., A DEBATE OVER RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHICAL
ENQUIRIES 7, 93 (1998).
130. See KRAMER, ET AL., supra note 129, at 62; Matthew H. Kramer & Hillel Steiner,
Theories of Rights: Is There a Third Way?, 27 Ox. J. LEGAL STUD. 281, 298 (2007).
131. See KRAMER, ET AL., supra note 129, at 62; Kramer & Steiner, supra note 130, at
298.
132. For the debate among Kramer, Simmonds, and Steiner, see KRAMER, ET AL.,
supra note 129.
133. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
134. See Ramsay, supra note 62; R. George Wright, Consenting Adults: The Problem
of Enhancing Human Dignity Non-Coercively, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1397, 1418 (1995)
(contemplating a televised fully consensual spousal death-hunt).
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For our purposes, though, we can set aside many of the arguments
involved in debates between interest-based and will theories of rights.
The key point is that the will theory's emphasis on locating an authorized
person who can legitimately consent to exercise or waive a right does not
address, let alone resolve, the basic problems associated with the idea of
valid consent posed above.1 35 Unless a will theory can address these
problems, will theory cannot undermine the judgment that the severe
problems associated with the idea of consent should encourage a greater
focus on the underlying basic interests and basic goods at stake in a
given case.
VI. CONSENT, BASIC INTERESTS, AND RECENT TRENDS IN THINKING
ABOUT AUTONOMY AND PATERNALISM
The cultural currents are, in general, running in such a way as to
increase the meaningfulness and viability of ideas of basic interests
relative to ideas of meaningful consent. Briefly put, in an age that is
increasingly suspicious of metaphysics, the metaphysical commitments
of the idea of basic interests or basic goods are less ambitious, less
controversial, and thus, less vulnerable to increasing skepticism than are
traditional ideas of valid consent. Consider the difference in
metaphysical ambition between claiming that someone has an interest in
their basic health, and instead claiming, far more ambitiously, that
someone has displayed genuine agency in exercising genuinely
autonomous consent.
Attitudes toward metaphysically ambitious and controversial ideas of
autonomy, free choice, consent, and even paternalism have evolved in
recent decades. These trends operate at a more fundamental level than
familiar legal qualms over the effects of "ignorance, duress,
misrepresentation, pressure, or the like" 136 on consent. At the extreme,
rejection of the ambitious metaphysics of freely expressed consent takes
the form of a reductionist view of the person. 37 The "choosing" person
is, in these increasingly influential views, reduced to an entity incapable
of meaningful choosing. Persons are taken to amount to something
135. See supra Sections II-IV.
136. Onora O'Neill, Between Consenting Adults, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 252, 254
(1985); see also id. at 255 ("Consent may not extend to the logical implications, likely
results, or the indispensable presuppositions of that which is explicitly consented to."); id.
("A choice between marriage partners does not show that the married life has been
chosen."); id. at 256 (referring to "problems of the defeasibility and indeterminacy of
consent, of ideological distortions and self-deception, and of impaired capacities to
consent," along with "the opacity of intentionality").
137. See infra notes 148-150.
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vaguely like "a chemical scum ' 38 a "bag of chemicals,''139 or a "pack ofneurons." 140
The problem with these latter views is that, while chemical scum and
the like cannot meaningfully consent to anything, it is also reasonably
uncontroversial 141 that chemical scum and other such entities cannot have
interests or basic goods. If, on the other hand, the contemporary
reductionist impulse can settle for less extreme outcomes, some genuine
progress may be possible.
Consider, for example, the view that humans can be reduced to "a
particular sort of ape infested with memes."' 142 On the one hand, we do
not typically assume that apes are capable of free and informed consent
regarding experimentation or conditions of confinement. But most of us
would say, on the other hand, that apes can have basic interests, or
fundamental goods, as in the case of health versus serious disease,
avoiding starvation, or avoiding continuous narrow confinement. 43 The
life of an ape can go better, or worse, in this sense, unlike that of a mere
combination of chemicals, or a collection of neurons.
In general, as we increasingly think of human behavior in
materialist1 44 or narrowly naturalist 45 terms, the idea of human
138. Stephen Hawking is quoted to that effect in DAVID DEUTSCH, THE FABRIC OF
REALITY: THE SCIENCE OF PARALLEL UNIVERSES AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 177 (1998) and in
PAUL DAVIS, THE GOLDILOCKs ENIGMA: WHY IS THE UNIVERSE JUST RIGHT FOR LIFE? 222
(2008).
139. Anthony R. Cashmore, The Lucretian Swerve: The Biological Basis of Human
Behavior and the Criminal Justice System, PNAS (Mar. 9, 2010), www.pnas.org/cgi/doi
/10.1073/pnas.0915161107.
140. FRANCIS CRICK, THE ASTONISHING HYPOTHESIS: THE SCIENTIFIC SEARCH FOR THE
SoUL 3 (1995).
141. But see the broad scope of having a good, encompassing the good even of
inanimate substances, in THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA Pt. I of pt. II, qu. 94,
art. 2, respondio, (2017) (1485), https://www/newadvent.org/summa.
142. Susan Blackmore, The Evolution of Meme Machines, SUSANBLACKMORE.UK
(2002), www.susandblackmore.co.uk/conferences/Ontopsych.htm (quoting the renowned
philosopher Daniel Dennett).
143. See generally In re Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, 152 A.D.3d 73,
(N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (denying habeas corpus petition filed on behalf of chimpanzees).
144. See, e.g., William Ramsey, Eliminative Materialism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHIL. (Apr. 16, 2013), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/materialism-eliminative/; see also
DANIEL DENNETT, FREEbOM EVOLVES 2-3 (2003) ("We are each made of mindless robots
and nothing else, no non-physical, non-robotic ingredients at all.").
145. See, e.g., David Papineau, Naturalism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (rev. ed.
Sept. 15, 2015), https://plato/stanford.edu/entries/naturalism; see also RICHARD RORTY,
PHrLOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 387 (1980) (discussing a naturalism of atoms-
and-the-void as exhausting all there is).
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decisionmakers as exercising free 146 and informed, autonomous, 147
genuine consent becomes far less plausible. The absence of genuine free
will may eventually require that we abandon 148 classical ideas of
autonomy 149 in favor of thinned out, evacuated, metaphysically
attenuated, minimalist senses of autonomy. 5 °
And as conceptions of freedom of the will and autonomy gradually
erode, we should naturally expect that the classic opposition between
free consent on the one hand and paternalism 151 on the other will
increasingly lose clarity, meaningfulness, and overall significance. As we
become increasingly conscious of our decision making irrationalities,"'
and especially as we lose faith in the deeper, ambitious, most robust
senses of autonomy, the natural move is to focus less on dubious
questions of consent, and more on the pragmatic, less controversial,
largely observable costs of a decision in terms of obvious basic interests
and fundamental goods. 53
146. For a sense of contemporary doubts as to the meaningfulness of free will, and
those activities that would seem to depend upon free will, see JOHN MARTIN FISCHER,
ROBERT KANE, DERK PEREBOOM & MANUEL VARGAS, FOUR ViEwS ON FREE WILL (2009)
and especially SAUL SMILANSKY, FREE WILL AND ILLUSION (2002). See also RICHARD
DOUBLE, THE NON-REALITY OF FREE WILL (1990).
147. See generally GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY
(1988); Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, in THE INNER CITADEL: ESSAYS ON INDIVIDUAL
AUTONOMY 27 (John Christman ed., 2014).
148. See, e.g., ROBERT KANE, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FREE WILL 80 (1996) (discussing
meaningful free will as arguably necessary for autonomy in the sense of self-creation);
Goran Duus-Otterstrom, Freedom of Will and the Value of Choice, 37 SOC. THEORY &
PRAC. 256, 256 (2011) ("the reasons to value choice depend on our having (libertarian)
free will."). See generally ROBERT LOCKIE, FREE WILL AND EPISTEMOLOGY: A DEFENSE
OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT FOR FREEDOM (2018).
149. See PICO DELLA MIRANDOLA, ON THE DIGNITY OF MAN 5 (Charles Glenn Wallis
trans., Hackett Pub. Co. 1998) (1486); IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 114 (H.J. Paton trans., Harper & Row, Pub. 1964) (1785)
(linking freedom or autonomy with rationality, as distinct from any sort of biological or
physical causation).
150. Note our willingness to refer to even the humble Roomba© carpet cleaning
device, among other machines, as an "autonomous" robot. See generally GEORGE A.
BEKEY, AUTONOMOUS ROBOTS (reprint ed. 2017).
151. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 5 (John Gray ed.,
2008).; see also JULIAN LEGRAND & BILL NEW, GOVERNMENT PATERNALISM: NANNY
STATE OR HELPFUL FRIEND? 2 (2015). See generally GERALD DWORKIN, Paternalism,
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (June 4, 2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/patemal
ism.
152. For a convenient extensive list of social cognitive and decision making biases
affecting competent adults, see List of Cognitive Biases, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia
.org/wikilList_of_cognitive-biases (last edited Sep. 27, 2018).
153. See, e.g., SARAH CONLY, AGAINST AUTONOMY: JUSTIFYING COERCIVE
PATERNALISM 1 (2013) (arguing autonomy is "not valuable enough to offset what we lose
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As well, we are often in a position where we might meaningfully
consent on our own behalf, but where our supposed consent will entail
adverse effects on the basic interests of other people who have not even
begun consent. 54 In modem health care and health insurance contexts,
increasingly, the effects of everyone's decisions, consensual or not, on
the interests of others is increasingly substantial. 155 More broadly, in an
interdependent society, we increasingly claim to consent in contexts in
which the basic interests of other, clearly non-consenting, third parties
may be substantially affected. 156
VII. CONCLUSION
Far too often, the judicial inquiry into the presence or absence of
sufficient consent is more trouble than it is worth. In such cases, courts
should focus more substantially or more primarily 157 on the relevant
interests at stake, including especially the largely consensual basic goods
that might be jeopardized, traded off, or enhanced, through the
legislation or adjudication at hand. The centrality of the idea of consent
in the law is not matched by any real cogency theory in accounting for
our general political obligations, or lack thereof. Nor does the idea of
consent pull its weight in the broad area of private contracts, or as a
general criminal defense, or in the area of judicial bypass of parental
notice or consent requirements in the abortion access context.
As it turns out, though, the idea of basic interests and fundamental
goods on the other hand is reasonably determinate and consensually
by leaving people to their own autonomous choices"); Anthony N. DeMaria, The Nanny
State and 'Coercive Paternalism', 61 J. AM. C. OF CARDIOLOGY 2108, 2109 (2013)
("[s]elf-induced disease is common, largely preventable, and at the very least an
economic burden to society."). Of course, among our various interests, we may well want
to include autonomy, or perceived autonomy, at least in the sense of not continually
having unappealing decisions imposed upon us.
154. See C.L. TEN, MILL ON LBERTY 11 (1980) (Mill readily and explicitly admits that
"self-regarding conduct affects others").
155. See DeMaria, supra note 153, at 2109. More broadly, see R. George Wright, Can
Health Care Policy Be Guided by Basic Values?: The Crucial Role of Perfectionist
Solidarity, 86 U. CINN. L. REv. (forthcoming 2018).
156. Our health care and insurance choices at this point clearly affect the interests of
other, nonconsenting parties, but so also do many of our risky or ill-advised consumption
and lifestyle choices.
157. Considerations of interests and of basic goods should thus displace many
discussions of consent. But this does not mean that courts should focus directly,
immediately, and explicitly on interests and goods, apart from, any relevant precedent
cases, elements, defenses, and statutory priorities. Interest or basic good analysis instead
typically works with any precedents, elements, defenses, or statutory priorities that can
properly be taken as given
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understood. At the very least, the idea of interests contributes as much to
our understanding of rights as does the idea of willing as a form of
consent. The idea of a basic good does not require controversial
metaphysical foundations. Developments in contemporary thinking about
autonomy and paternalism further damage the case for emphasizing
purported consent more than pursuing basic interests. Thus wherever
possible, we are best advised to click through the inherent murkiness of
consent issues, and to focus instead on adjudicating among, and
promoting, basic interests.
